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Розглядаються проблема багатокри­
теріального аналізу ефективності кон­
сервативних систем захисту інформації, 
структура та складові яких не змінюють­
ся протягом деякого часу. Структурна 
схема таких систем включає об’єкт захис­
ту, вразливості – канали для атак, загро­
зи та засоби захисту. 
За припущення про незалежність атак 
та засобів захисту розвинуто дискретну 
ймовірнісну модель ушкодженості об’єк­
та захисту. Для випадкової величини кіль­
кості ушкоджень за фіксований проміжок 
часу отримано представлення у вигляді 
суми біноміально розподілених випадко­
вих величин, які залежать від параметрів 
атак та захисту. Подібно описано випад­
кові величини економічних втрат, часу 
відновлення та затрат на відновлення, 
для яких знайдено в аналітичному вигля­
ді математичні сподівання та дисперсії. 
Для забезпечення високої статистичної 
надійності показники ризику запропоно­
вано визначати за допомогою нерівності 
Кантеллі. На цій основі сформульовано 
ряд показників ефективності системи за­ 
хисту, які характеризують ймовірність 
неушкодженості об’єкта захисту, залиш­
кові втрати, умовно збережені кошти, 
живучість та затрати на відновлення. 
З використанням теорії оптимальнос­
ті за Парето розроблено методику багато­
критеріального аналізу та раціонально­
го проектування консервативних систем 
захисту інформації. Апробацію проведе­
но для систем захисту аудіо інформації. 
Фронт Парето досліджено за критерія­
ми економічної вигоди та інвестиційних 
затрат для 66 варіантів захисту. Вивчено 
вплив рівня захисту на показник Кантеллі 
умовно збережених коштів та вклад у нього 
засобів захисту різного типу. 
Результати досліджень підтвердили 
закон насичення Гордона­Льоба, коли над­
мірний захист не приводить до підвищення 
ефективності систем захисту
Ключові слова: системи захисту інфор­
мації, ризик, ефективність, багатокрите­
ріальний аналіз, модель Гордона­Льоба
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1. Introduction
The three main resources used by humans in their life 
activities are information, matter, and energy. The task on in-
formation security is gaining increasingly greater importance 
due to the wide application of information technology in all 
spheres, as well as its affordability. Unauthorized interference 
in the information flows among computerized systems can 
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lead both to local problems and global threats to the techno-
logical, economic, political, and military security, as well as 
the safety of a state in general.
Based on the results from annual experts’ business risk ana-
lysis «Allianz Risk Barometer» that has since 2001 been com-
piled by the financial group Allianz Global Corporate & Spe-
cialty, cyber-risks shifted from position 15 in 2013 to position 2 
in 2018 [1]. The report by the World Economic Forum «Re-
gional risks for business 2018» [2] identified cybersecurity 
as the main risk for Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Americas. 
Therefore, it is a relevant issue to assess risk and overall 
effectiveness of information security systems.
2. Literature review and problem statement
Assessment of the effectiveness of security systems is 
a complex and multifaceted task, predetermined by the struc-
tural complexity of information systems and, accordingly, 
security systems, by the variety of vulnerabilities and the 
non-regular character of threats. 
The effectiveness of protection systems is defined, above 
all, by their capability to reduce risks, which is why indica-
tors for residual risks are among the main indicators for the 
efficiency of these systems. 
A series of methods were developed in order to quantita-
tively describe risks, which employed both classic stochastic 
models [3, 4] and the theory of fuzzy sets [5, 6], and the game 
theory and simulation modeling [4, 7, 8].
When using stochastic models, the widely applied risk 
indicator is the mathematical expectation for a random va-
riable (r. v.) of possible losses over a year – Annual Loss Ex-
pectancy (ALE) [3, 4]. In this case, scientists often scale the 
probabilities and possible consequences of threats, followed 
by the construction of matrices of expected losses for all 
threats, and a summary matrix of losses for which a numeric 
or symbolic scale for the magnitude of a risk is introduced. 
Based on the overall magnitude of ALE, they calculate rela-
tive indicators, accepting as a base the cost of capital, inves-
ted funds, possible losses if not protected, etc.
A general economic model for the dependence of mathe-
matical expectation of conditionally saved funds on the 
magnitude of investment in information security, the expec-
ted net benefits from an investment in information security 
(ENBIS), was proposed in paper [9]. This model underlies 
a series of works whose results are generalized in study [10]. 
Although the mathematical expectation of losses satisfies 
all axioms of coherence on risk measures [11], for a symmet-
rical distribution of losses, this magnitude can be exceeded 
with a probability of 50 %. Therefore, it is suitable for the 
case when the standard deviation of losses is small.
For a more accurate description of risk, researchers apply, 
in particular, a quantile of a certain level in the distribution 
function of a random variable of losses – Value at Risk (VaR), 
or the mathematical expectation of losses that exceed this 
magnitude – Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) [12]. The 
application of these risk measures for the assessment of infor-
mational risks was considered in papers [13–16]. Specifically, 
work [13] investigated the dependence of indicator VaR for 
the losses of information security on average daily cost of 
protection based on the simulation of loss of data for a group 
of financial companies, without considering the structure of 
protection. A model and an algorithm for calculating the mag-
nitude of VaR of losses for cybersecurity systems based on the 
dynamic Bayesian networks to simulate the attacks and on the 
Monte Carlo method were proposed in paper [14]. A modeling 
problem on the calculation of loss indicators VaR and CVaR 
for a corporate information system, based on an empirical 
distribution function, was considered in [15]. A problem on 
the bicriterial optimization for the criteria cost-risk using the 
VaR and CVaR risk measures was investigated in paper [16].
The calculation of VaR and CVaR risk indicators requires 
the knowledge of an empirical distribution function of a ran-
dom magnitude of losses, or the approximation of the upper 
tail of its distribution function with known distribution [12]. 
A risk measure that is close to VaR, yet a simpler one, is 
derived from the Chebyshev-Cantelli inequality [17]; the 
Chebyshev inequality was used in paper [18] to assess risk for 
a system of information security. 
In addition to the indicators for residual risk, also of im-
portance for information security systems are the average time 
of system recovery, average costs of recovery, probabilities of 
damage to a protected object, capital and current costs, etc.
Therefore, in general, assessing the effectiveness of infor-
mation security systems is multicriterial in character. 
The issue on a multicriterial analysis of efficiency of 
information security systems has not been studied in detail. 
Paper [7] reports a comparative analysis of eight studies in 
this field up to 2016, which applied the apparatus of a game 
theory and combinatorial optimization.
Paper [19] proposes a procedure for a multicriterial 
estimation of cybersecurity risks and the effectiveness of 
countermeasures based on the method of scalarization and 
expert assessments. The total risk estimate is obtained as 
a linear combination of the individual risk indicators, which, 
in turn, may be represented similarly through the lower-level 
risk indicators. Similarly defined are the efficiency indica-
tors for countermeasures in terms of respective risk taking 
into consideration the magnitude of the latter. The total 
efficiency indicator equals a linear combination with some of 
the weight coefficients for certain lower-level performance 
indicators. In addition to expert estimates for individual 
risks and countermeasures, the procedure requires expert 
assessment of weight coefficients in the method of scalariza-
tion. The authors considered a model example of ranking five 
cybersecurity strategies based on effectiveness.
Study [20] addresses the task on choosing an optimal 
plan to protect an information-telecommunication system 
based on the criteria of the largest financial attractiveness 
and the lowest indicator of the overall impact on a busi-
ness-process (operational impact assessment – OIA). The 
focus is on assessing the OIA indicator, which is defined by 
the authors as the probability of a conflict with a company’s 
mission and is calculated based on the authentic procedure. 
Our analysis testifies to the expediency of devising a pro-
cedure for a multicriterial estimation of the effectiveness 
of information security systems by using an adequate and 
simple model of damage caused by attacks, which would take 
into consideration the structure of protection, as well as the 
stochastic character of threats’ effect.
3. The aim and objectives of the study
The aim of this study is to devise and verify a procedure 
for a multicriterial analysis of the efficiency of conservative 
information security systems based on a discrete probabilistic 
model of losses caused by attacks. That would make it possible 
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to perform a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of pro-
tection variants when designing security systems and to exa-
mine the contribution of different protection tools to security.
To accomplish the aim, the following tasks have been set:
– to advance a discrete probabilistic model of security 
system that takes into consideration the structure of pro-
tection and the random character of threats and provides 
an analytical description for the random variable of losses 
caused by attacks;
– to define simple and reliable indicators for residual risk 
based on the Cantelli inequality, as well as other indicators 
for the effectiveness of a security system;
– to apply a Pareto optimality theory to devise a procedure 
for a multicriterial analysis of the security system efficiency;
– to perform practical verification of the procedure for 
a multicriterial analysis of efficiency for the audio informa-
tion security systems.
4. Development of a discrete probabilistic model of losses 
considering the structure of protection
The systems of technical protection are complex technical 
systems that enhance the safety of protected objects against 
illegal acts and other influences that may disrupt their func-
tioning. The concept of a technical protection system covers 
the following basic components: protected objects, vulnera-
bilities, threats, protection tools, as well as a security mana-
gement system. For conservative or static security systems 
whose structure and components do not change over a long 
time, the security management system is used only to control 
protection tools and replace them in case of malfunctioning.
Such a simplified scheme (object, vulnerabilities, threats, 
protection) makes it possible to describe in the same manner 
the systems of technical protection of different types, as 
well as combined systems, specifically information security 
systems. Authors of [18, 21] constructed a stochastic model 
of losses for it, as well as the procedure for estimating the 
economic efficiency of investment in security systems. 
By following the methodology of these works in general, 
we shall consider a stochastic model with an investment 
horizon of one year, in which individual protected objects are 
aggregated into a single generalized object.
Assume the protected object O has K primary vulner-
abilities V1, V2, …, VK, which are the channels for attacks. 
A security system includes M protection tools S1, S 2,…, SM. 
Arrows in Fig. 1 show possible attacks of a primary damage, 
rectangles show the protection tools.
 
Fig.	1.	Structural	diagram	of	protection:		
O – protected	object,	V k	–	vulnerabilities,		
Sm	–	protection	tools
Assume that all attacks and protection tools are indepen-
dent in the sense that the response by a protection tool to any 
attack is not related to other tools or attacks; all protection 
tools operate properly during an attack. We also believe that 
one knows the number of attacks along each channel over a year. 
The probabilities of security breach Sm while protec-
ting the V k channel shall be denoted via amk, m M=1 2, , ..., , 
k K=1 2, , ..., . For the case when protection Sm does not 
protect the Vk channel, amk =1. Note that there is no need for 
the graphical representation of a security system since matrix 
A amk= [ ] fully defines the structure of protection. 
The probability of security breach along the Vk channel is 
equal to the product of probabilities of hacking all protection 
tools that protect this channel:
r ak mk
m
M
=
=
∏
1
.  (1)
Under the accepted assumption on the independence of 
protection tools and attacks, the total quantity of primary 
damage to the system will be the sum of binomially distri-
buted random variables [21]:
ξ  Bin n rk k
k
K
( , ),
=
∑
1
 (2)
where nk is the average number of attacks per period along 
channel k, Bin(n, r) is the binomially distributed r. v. with 
parameters n and r [17]. 
Note that for the case when the number of attacks nk 
along channel k is less than unity, but one knows the proba-
bility of attack pk, then one should put in formula (2):
nk =1,  r p ak k mk
m
M
=
=
∏
1
.  (3)
The absolute reliability of a security system is characterized 
by a probability of absence of any damage, which is equal to:
Q P r
k
K
k
nk( ) { } ( ) .ξ ξ= = = −
=
∏0 1
1
 (4)
The magnitude of total economic losses from a successful 
initial attack along channel Vk, taking into consideration 
secondary damage, shall be denoted via wk. Assume that the 
losses from a possible damage to protection tools are negli-
gible. Then the random variable of the total economic losses 
caused by attacks, considering formula (2), will be equal to:
W w Bin n rk k k
k
K
=
=
∑ ( , ) .
1
 (5)
Based on it, we find the mathematical expectation for 
possible losses caused by attacks WE, their variance WD, as 
well as losses in the absence of protection tools W*:
W E W w r nE k k k
k
K
= =
=
∑( ) ,
1
 (6)
W D W w r r nD k k k k
k
K
= = −
=
∑( ) ( ) , 2
1
1  W WDs = ( )1 2/ ,  (7)
W w nk k
k
K
∗
=
= ∑
1
.  (8)
Thus, in the framework of the proposed model, we have 
derived simple formulae for the probability of no damage to 
a protected object, the mathematical expectation, and the 
variance of losses caused by attacks.
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5. Defining effectiveness indicators for a security system
The indicators for a random variable of losses caused by 
attacks do not include the cost of protection tools. Assume 
that the amount of current expenditures and the averaged 
capital cost of a protection tool Sm over a period is the magni-
tude Cm, then the total cost of equipment over a period equals:
C Cm
m
M
=
=
∑
1
.  (9)
Therefore, the random variable of total losses L  con-
sidering the costs and equipment will be equal to the sum of 
magnitudes (5) and (9):
 L C W= + .  (10)
Its mathematical expectation and variance are deter-
mined as follows:
L E L C W C w r nE E k k k
k
K
= = + = +
=
∑( ) ,
1
 (11)
L D L W w r r nD D k k k k
k
K
= = = −
=
∑( ) ( ) , 2
1
1  L LDs = ( )1 2/ .  (12)
Under assumptions LE < +∞, LD < +∞, as it follows from 
the Cantelli inequality [17], the total losses L  do not exceed 
the magnitude:
L L LR E= + l s ,  l > 0,  (13)
at reliability:
a l l= +2 21/ ( ).  (14)
The random variable of conditionally saved funds is:
  B W L W C W= − = − −
∗ ∗
,  (15)
at reliability a, it will be no less than magnitude:
B W L LR E= − −∗ l s .  (16)
The best variant is the protection with a lower indica-
tor LR, or with a larger indicator BR. 
Note that the magnitude of mathematical expectation 
for conditionally saved funds B W LE E= −∗  corresponds to the 
indicator ENBIS (expected net benefits from an investment 
in information security), introduced in paper [9]. 
To represent the results, it is also convenient to consider 
the dimensionless parameters. We shall introduce a dimen-
sionless magnitude for conditionally saved funds b :

b B W=
∗
.  (17)
Based on the formulae above, it is easy to write down the 
mathematical expectation and a standard deviation of this 
magnitude, denoted, respectively, by bE and bs:
b B WE E= * ,  (18)
b B Ws s= * .  (19)
Similarly, at probability (18), the random variable b  will 
be no less than magnitude:
b b bR E= − l s .  (20)
To describe the averaged cost of equipment, we shall also 
introduce a dimensionless indicator:
c C W=
∗
.  (21)
Hereafter, the magnitude bE is referred to as a mathema-
tical expectation, or the average conditional saving, and the 
magnitude bR – a Cantelli’s measure of conditional savings. 
We shall also record the r. v. of system recovery time T , 
which characterizes its survivability. To this end, we intro-
duce the magnitude tk for the total time of recovery after 
a successful primary attack along channel Vk, taking into 
consideration secondary damage. 
Additionally, we assume that attacks do not occur while 
the system recovers. Then the r. v. of recovery time is recor-
ded similar to (5):
T t Bin r nk k k
j k
K
=
=
∑ ( , ).  (22)
Its mathematical expectation, variance, and recovery 
time in the absence of protection tools are recorded similar 
to formulae (6) to (8):
T E T t r nE k k k
k
K
= =
=
∑( ) ,
1
 (23) 
T D T t r r nD k k k k
k
K
= = −
=
∑( ) ( ) , 2
1
1  T TDs = ( )1 2/ ,  (24)
T t nk k
k
K
∗
=
= ∑
1
.  (25)
Similarly, one can determine a random amount of funds 
for recovery. This magnitude does not equal the total losses 
caused by attacks, since the latter include possible losses 
caused by information leak. 
Note that for the r. v. of the system recovery time (22) 
and the cost of recovery it is easy to record indicators, similar 
to (18), (20). 
Thus, for a conservative system of information security, 
under a series of simplifying assumptions on attacks and pro-
tection, we have defined a series of indicators, averaged over 
a period, which variously characterize a system of protection.
6. Procedure for a multicriterial assessment  
of security systems
Let S = ( , , , )S S SM1 2   be a set of protection tools (a pro-
tection variant), f S S S S R( ) ( ), ( ), ..., ( )= ( )∈f f fl l1 2  – a vector 
of criteria, X is the set of permissible variants, I l= { , , ..., }1 2  is 
the set of indexes. One can then state the problem on a mul-
ticriterial optimization for choosing the optimal protection 
variant [22]:
f S
S
( ) max.→
∈X
 (26)
To analyze this problem, we introduce the notion of domi-
nance and effective set [22]. Protection S1 dominates over 
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protection S2  ( )S S1 2  if it is not worse than S2  for all the 
criteria and is the best for at least one, that is the following 
condition is satisfied:
f S f S f S f S( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .1 2 1 2≠( )∧ ≥( )  (27)
An effective set P(X)ÌX (a Pareto set) denotes the set of 
non-dominating protection variants – those options that are 
not dominated by any other variant from the permitted set:
P X X X
i I f fi i
( ) { | ( ) ( )
: ( ) ( )}.
= ′ ∈ ∀ ∈ ≠ ′ ⇒
⇒∃ ∈ < ′
S S f S f S
S S  (28)
Vectors from the effective set cannot be improved for 
any criterion without compromising other criteria. That is 
why the points within this set are accepted as a compromise 
solution to the problem of a multicriterial optimization (26). 
In our case, the permissible set is a finite discrete set. 
Therefore, it is possible to construct the effective set by 
consistent sorting of pairs excluding from further conside-
ration the dominated variants based on definition (28). For 
a two-dimensional and a three-dimensional case, it is easy 
to represent an effective set graphically in the criteria space.
7. Results of studying the effectiveness of audio 
information security system
We have examined a one-year investment project of a sys-
tem to protect business premises from audio information 
leakage. Calculations were carried out by means of electronic 
spreadsheets. 
General characteristics for attacks and protection tools, 
the price of protection tools, were acquired from the 
Internet, numerical characteristics for attacks and the 
reliability of protection tools were derived from an expert 
analysis [23]. 
We considered 8 types of vulnerabilities that are de-
scribed in Table 1.
Table	1
Description	of	vulnerabilities	and	attacks
Chan-
nel 
num-
ber
Channel title
Number of 
attacks, or 
the probabi-
lity of an 
attack per  
a year
Magnitude 
of losses 
caused by  
a successful 
attack, UAH 
thousand
1 V1 – radio microphones 10 40
2 V2 – digital communication 16 40
3
V3 – direct electromagnetic 
radiation and induction
20 40
4 V4 – dictaphones 12 40
5 V5 – construction structures 24 40
6 V6 – electric grid 10 40
7
V7 – burglar and fire alarm 
systems
10 40
8 V8 – telephone line 10 40
We used 11 types of protection tools whose characte-
ristics are given in Table 2. Trade names of the tools are not 
provided to prevent bad publicity.
Table	2
Characteristics	of	protection	tools
Num-
ber of 
protec-
tion – m 
Total 
cost, 
UAH 
thousand
Probability of security breach m  
during attack along channel k–amk 
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8
1. Wideband radio channel blockers
1 19 0.08 1 0.10 1 1 1 1 1
2 16 0.05 1 0.05 1 1 1 1 1
3 15 0.10 1 0.10 1 1 1 1 1
4 10 0.10 1 0.10 1 1 1 1 1
2. Digital channels protection
5 114 1 0.03 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 86 1 0.04 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 48 1 0.04 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 27 1 0.05 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 10 1 0.05 1 1 1 1 1 1
3. Systems of acoustic and vibroacoustic protection
10 85 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
11 24 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
12 26 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
13 12 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
14 12 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
4. Vibroacoustic noise generators
15 22 1 1 1 1 0.03 1 1 1
16 18 1 1 1 1 0.04 1 1 1
17 14 1 1 1 1 0.05 1 1 1
18 10 1 1 1 1 0.06 1 1 1
5. Dictaphone jammers
19 124 1 1 1 0.01 1 1 1 1
20 37 1 1 1 0.02 1 1 1 1
21 19 1 1 1 0.03 1 1 1 1
22 8 1 1 1 0.05 1 1 1 1
6. Power supply filters
23 17 1 1 1 1 1 0.02 1 1
24 15 1 1 1 1 1 0.02 1 1
25 13 1 1 1 1 1 0.03 1 1
26 9 1 1 1 1 1 0.03 1 1
7. Filters of burglar and fire alarm systems
27 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.01 1
28 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.02 1
29 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.03 1
8. Telephone lines filters
30 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.01
31 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.02
32 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.02
33 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.02
9. Scanning radio receivers
34 170 0.02 0.03 0.03 1 1 1 1 1
35 35 0.03 0.04 0.05 1 1 1 1 1
36 28 0.03 0.04 0.05 1 1 1 1 1
37 12 0.04 0.05 0.1 1 1 1 1 1
38 10 0.04 0.05 0.1 1 1 1 1 1
10. Universal search tools
39 401 0,01 0.01 0.02 1 1 0.01 0.01 0.01
40 291 0,01 0.01 0.02 1 1 0.01 0.01 0.02
41 279 0,02 0.03 0.03 1 1 0.01 0.01 0.02
42 225 0,03 0.03 0.03 1 1 0.02 0.02 0.02
43 110 0,03 0.03 0.03 1 1 0.02 0.02 0.02
11. Nonlinear locators
44 602 0.02 0.02 1 0.02 1 1 1 1
45 393 0.02 0.02 1 0.02 1 1 1 1
46 236 0.03 0.03 1 0.03 1 1 1 1
47 199 0.03 0.03 1 0.04 1 1 1 1
48 182 0.04 0.04 1 0.04 1 1 1 1
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We studied 66 variants of varying degrees of protection 
when some of the channels are unprotected, all channels are 
protected by a single or several protection tools. For risk in-
dicators, we used a parameter value l = 3, which ensures their 
90 % reliability (a = 0.9). 
The results of analysis of the two-criterial optimization 
problem with a vector criterion −( )c bE( ), ( )S S  are shown in 
Fig. 2. Letters A, B, C mark the points from the effective set. 
A solid curve represents the mean square approximation of 
dependence b cE ~  using a Gordon-Loeb approximation [9]:
b c cE ≈ − + −
−1 1( ) ,a β  (29)
where a > 0, β > 0 are the numeric parameters. 
Fig.	2.	Dependence	of	mathematical	expectation		
for	conditional	saving	bE	on	the	index	of	investment	volume	c
.
.
.
.
.
. .
bЕ
с
Point A(0.0028; 0.9272) and point B(0.0058; 0.9272) cor-
respond to the protection variants with a single protection 
tool – S = (14) and S = (12), and point C(0.0066; 0.9730) – to 
the variant with five protection tools – S = (12, 24, 28, 31, 36). 
In the upper-left corner, red color highlights a set of rational 
protection variants whose efficiency exceeds 90 % for cri-
terion bE, and whose price is less than 10 % of losses in the 
absence of protection.
A similar study was conducted based on criterion 
−( )c bR( ), ( ) ,S S  the results are shown in Fig. 3. 
The points from the effective set A(0.0028; 0.8549), 
B(0.0058; 0.9158), C(0.0066; 0.9446) correspond to the 
same protection variants in the previous case. In the upper- 
left corner, red squares show the set of rational protection 
variants whose efficiency exceeds 90 % for criterion bR, 
and whose price is less than 10 % of losses in the absence of 
protection.
A solid curve shows the root mean square approximation of 
dependence b cR ~  using a Gordon-Loeb approximation (29).
In both cases (Fig. 2, 3), one observes the effect of satu-
ration [9], when the increased investment in protection does 
not lead to the improvement of risk indicators. 
An analysis of the standard deviation indicator bs  has 
revealed that it does not exceed 3 % and decreases with an 
increase in the indicator of investment c. That is why the in-
dicators of risk bR (20) and mathema tical expectation bE (18) 
for the conditionally saved funds differ by less than 10 %. 
However, the set of rational protection variants based on the 
criterion of risk is twice smaller than the same set based on 
the criterion of mathematical expectation.
Fig.	3.	Dependence	of	the	Cantelli’s	measure	of	conditional		
saving	bR	on	the	indicator	of	investment	volume	c
.
.
.
.
.
. .
bR
с
Denote the medium level of protection as the ratio of the 
number of protection tools to the number of vulnerabilities:
m =M K/ .  (30)
Fig. 4 shows the dependence of the Cantelli’s measure of 
conditional saving bR on the average level of protection m. 
Similar to previous dependences, there is the saturation in 
terms of risk indicator if the average level of protection is 
greater than unity.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Fig.	4.	Dependence	of	the	Cantelli’s	measure	of	conditional	
saving	bR	on	the	average	protection	level	m
Consider a protection variant S = (S1, S2,…, SM). Let H be 
a certain measure of its efficiency, Hm – this indicator for the 
case when tool Sm is excluded from protection. The relative 
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contribution of protection tool Sm to indicator H is charac-
terized by magnitude:
dm mH H H= −( )/ ,  m M=1 2, , ..., .  (31)
We considered two similar protection variants whose 
protection tools belong to groups 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 (Table 2) 
but have a different price: S1 = (4, 7, 18, 22, 26, 29, 32) – 
cheaper, and S2 = (1, 5, 15, 19, 23, 27, 30) – expensive. Fig. 5 
shows a comparative diagram of vectors d = (d1, d2,…, d7) for 
the specified variants.
Fig.	5.	Relative	contribution	of	protection	tools	dm		
to	the	aggregate	risk	indicator	bR	for	various	m :		
1	–	tools	4	and	1;	2	–	7	and	5;	3	–	18	and	15;	4	–	22	and	19;	
5	–	26	and	23;	6	–	29	and	27;	7	–	32	and	30	
 
dm
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
1 2 3
cheap; expensive
4 5 6 7 m
We see that the greatest contribution to indicator bR, 
regardless of cost, is provided by protection tools 1 and 3 
(respectively, of type 1 and 4 from Table 2). 
Similar studies can be performed for the other two or 
more criteria, specifically (4), (6), (7), (11) to (13), (18), 
(20), (21), (23), (24), (30).
8. Discussion of the results obtained;  
prospects for further research
We have developed a procedure for the multicriterial 
estimation of conservative security systems using a discrete 
probabilistic model of losses. Its advantages are simplicity 
and the application of risk indicators that are reliable in 
proba bilistic sense, for which we have derived analytical 
formulae. In contrast to the general economic theories, our 
procedure takes into consi deration the structure of protec-
tion and the stochastic nature of threats’ effect. It reduces 
the task on assessing the effectiveness of a protection system 
to the estimation of separate protection tools and it makes 
it possible to solve a problem on the rational choice of 
protection variants. That makes it possible to calculate the 
mathe matical expectation and indicators for the risk of losses 
caused by attacks, which is why it could be used to assess the 
cost of insurance rates when insuring security systems.
Of interest is the comparison of the obtained practical 
results with the economic theory by Gordon-Loeb [9], which 
confirmed the conclusion on that the over-protection could 
lead to a decrease in the overall efficiency of protection 
systems. 
The shortcoming of the procedure is the assumption 
about a conservative (stationary) character of protection. 
However, one can apply it for a quasi-static analysis of dy-
namic security systems by assigning the required time of 
stationarity. 
The procedure makes it possible to simultaneously con-
sider the threats of a different nature, since it takes into con-
sideration only their economic and probabilistic indicators. 
However, accounting for the interaction of threats is only 
possible through their aggregation into a single threat.
The proposed procedure for the multicriterial assess-
ment of security systems is suitable for analysis of different 
types of security systems, specifically combined systems of 
information security and physical safety; it could be used in 
the development and testing of simulation models of protec-
tion systems. It allows the expansion towards considering 
multiple protected objects, describing the number of attacks 
as a discretely distributed random variable, reviewing invest-
ment projects of any duration. 
The simplicity of the procedure makes it possible to use it 
in the learning process.
It is planned to further advance the proposed metho-
dology for calculating insurance premiums when insuring 
security systems, simulation modeling of security systems, 
quasi-static analysis of dynamic protection systems.
9. Conclusions 
1. We have advanced, for the conservative systems of 
information protection, a discrete probabilistic model that 
takes into consideration the structure of protection and 
provides an analytical notation of the random variable 
for the damage to a protected object. The model makes it 
possible to record simple formulae for the mathematical ex-
pectation and variance in a random variable of losses caused 
by attacks.
2. Based on the Cantelli’s inequality, we have derived 
simple and statistically significant indicators for residual 
risks. The analytical form, which is convenient for practical 
use, has enabled the formulation of a series of known and 
new indicators for the effectiveness of information secu-
rity systems that characterize the probability of damage 
to a protected object, conditional savings, time and costs 
of recovery.
3. In the framework of the model, based on the Pareto 
optimality theory, we have devised the procedure for a multi-
criterial analysis of protection systems efficiency. That makes 
it possible to perform the construction of an effective set of 
protection variants with a simple geometric interpretation 
for the case of two and three criteria.
4. 66 protection variants were investigated for the 
system that protects audio information. The effective set 
was built based on the criteria for the average condi-
tional sa ving – investment costs, the Cantelli’s measure 
of conditio nal savings – investment costs. In both cases, 
the effective set consists of three identical variants for 
protection, which demonstrate an investment cost in-
dicator within 0.28–0.66 % of possible losses without 
protection.
We have also defined a set of rational protection variants 
whose efficiency exceeds 90 % for the criterion of economic 
Information and controlling system
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benefit, and investment costs are less than 10 % of losses in 
the absence of protection. 
It was found that excessive protection leads to a decrease 
in the indicators for conditional savings, which agrees with 
the conclusions of the Gordon-Loeb economic model. 
Our study has shown the simplicity and efficiency of the 
proposed procedure for a comparative analysis and rational 
selection of protection variants, for determining a contri-
bution of various types of protection tools to performance 
indicators.
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